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The responses triggered by the euro crisis and the introduction of the 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure for selecting the President of the Commission 
have had significant implications for the constitutional construct and the 
political system of the EU. The volume edited by Fabbrini, Ballin and Somsen 
offers prime food for thought to reflect on fascinating issues ensuing from 
these recent developments. It constitutes a solid scholarly apparatus for 
understanding the status of the separation of powers within the EU and the 
Eurozone, the governance of the EU and the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the EU institutional system. The focus is explicitly placed on the executive 
and the legislator. The editors move from the desire to mend the 'remarkable 
dis-engagement by legal scholars from the study of the form of the 
government of the EU'1 and bring together contributions from EU lawyers, 
constitutional lawyers and political scientists from diverse academic cultures. 
A similarly interdisciplinary approach has featured in other perceptive and 
remarkably well-edited volumes on the fundamentals of the European 
project.2 The originality of the book reviewed here rests on the combination 
of accurate insights on the EU constitutional dynamics with concrete reform 
proposals. 
I will first discuss the chapters relating to the conception and functioning the 
EU institutional order, the 'New Intergovernmentalism' and the ensuing 
paradoxes of the EU constitutional order (Chs 2 and 14). Secondly, I will 
examine the contributions which address the governance of the Eurozone 
with a particular focus on the executive power (Chs 3 to 7 and 15). Thirdly, I 
will address the chapters tackling the pressing problem of democracy in the 
                                                 
* LLM European University Institute, alessandro.petti@eui.eu 
1 Federico Fabbrini, Ernst Hirsch Ballin and Han Somsen (eds) What Form of 
Government for the European Union and for the Eurozone? (Hart 2015)  3. 
2 D Chalmers, M Jachtenfuchs and C Joerges (eds), The End of the Eurocrats' Dream 
(CUP, 2016). 
260 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol 9 No.2 
EU (Chs 8 to 10). Finally, I will review the contributions dealing with the 
trends towards the parliamentarisation of the European Commission (Chs 11 
to 13). 
The volume opens with a powerful foreword by Goulard who denounces that 
'Europe' and 'Brussels' are increasingly perceived as the cause of all the woes 
of the Europeans. The contributions by Craig (Ch 2) and Puetter (Ch 14) offer 
a response to this widely shared belief suggesting a more balanced approach 
in assessing the shortcomings traditionally ascribed to the EU.  
Craig provides acute observations on the EU's institutional structure and 
democratic deficit. He notices that, despite the recent attempts to reduce 
the divide between political power and the political responsibilities in the EU 
by linking the President of the European Commission (EC) to the dominant 
political forces in the European Parliament (EP), the underlying democratic 
fragilities of the EU constitutional construct remain in place. The radical 
changes in the EU's institutional design needed to alleviate the democratic 
malaise (such as a single elected President for the EU as a whole)3 were 
opposed by the Member States: from their perspective, an increased 
democratic legitimacy of the EU political order would come alongside a 
decrease in status of the national parliaments and executives that domestic 
leaders were reluctant to accept.4 Craig thus advocates for a broader 
conception of constitutional responsibility of the Member States which goes 
beyond mere legal accountability and has to be derived, inter alia, from the 
duty of sincere cooperation. Building on these premises, Craig scrutinizes the 
institutional design of the EMU and the measures adopted to counteract the 
euro crisis. He concludes that the reflections on how the financial crisis has 
affected the foundations of the EU, its legitimacy and its allocation of 
powers, should induce to 'think […] about the constitutional responsibility of 
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Member States5 […], rather than working on the explicit or implicit 
assumption that the fault resides entirely with the EU'.6 
Putter's chapter addresses a key institutional evolution of the EU, namely the 
emerging role of the European Council and its President. With rigorous, 
insightful and convincing arguments, the author qualifies the Maastricht 
Treaty as a turning point of the European integration entailing an integration 
paradox. Since Maastricht, Member State governments have displayed 
interests in pursuing further integration to tackle policy interdependencies 
while remaining unwilling to allocate additional competences at the EU level. 
The ensuing institutional change is an increased intergovernmental 
cooperation which operates at the level of the European Council and the 
Council producing a 'new Intergovernmentalism'. In this renewed 
intergovernmental cooperation, the President of the European Council acts 
as an institutional engineer rather than as a supranational policy 
entrepreneur. Puetter, therefore, questions the possibility envisaged by 
Fabbrini (Ch 16) to politicise the President's office through a EU wide 
electoral process.7 Puetter argues that the 'state of disequilibrium'8 emerging 
from the post-Maastricht integration paradox is not a transitory 
phenomenon which could be easily replaced by progressive 
communitarisation9 and hence supranationalisation. 
The contributions by Craig and Puetter therefore emphasize the role of the 
Member States in shaping the EU constitutional construct giving a 
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comprehensive explanation of the paradoxes and inconsistencies of the EU 
governance as it stands and as it will evolve in the future. 
Several contributions to the volume address more specifically the governance 
of economic, monetary, and financial affairs in the Eurozone and in the EU 
with a focus on new institutional trends emerging in the exercise of the 
executive power. Callies (Ch 3) challenges the appropriateness of the current 
EU constitutional setting to tackle the multiple crises affecting the EU which 
stem from both technical and democratic deficits. The author praises the 
Community method as the expression of 'the dual legitimacy concept' based 
on the 'European principle of democracy' as expressed in Article 10(2) TEU 
which clarifies the channels of representation of the citizens and of Member 
State governments in the EU polity. He denounces that the 'pure 
intergovernmental form of coordination developed during the financial and 
debt crisis' resulted in the abandonment of the ''Community method' 
characterizing European integration and the specific institutional balance set 
out in the European treaties'.10 Callies thus embraces a predominant thesis in 
the euro crisis literature, namely that the responses to the crisis have brought 
about a change in the EU constitutional balance towards a greater recourse 
to intergovernmental decision-making.11 
In the last sections of his chapter, Callies addresses the features that a viable 
Eurozone should have. The possibility of establishing an 'Euro-Parliament' 
composed of members of national parliaments is examined: this third 
chamber would complement the Council and the European Parliament. In 
the end of the contribution, the inevitability of Treaty reform is stressed. In 
case of absence of consensus, this reform could also take the shape of a 
'Europe of two speeds' with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the EMU (TSCG) paving the way for structured patterns of 
differentiated integration. Callies' chapter intertwines perceptive and 
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exceptionally sound legal analysis with original reform proposals. It is in the 
former that the contribution certainly excels. As far as the latter are 
concerned, I harbour doubts on the benefits of establishing the 'Euro-
Parliament'. If its members would consist of national parliamentarians to 
ensure that nationally sensitive policy fields (economic, fiscal, budgetary and 
social policy) remain in the hand of domestic politicians,12 it is not clear why 
this additional chamber should be established at the European level in the 
first place. Moreover, the national parliaments are represented in the EU 
decision-making process through their governments sitting in the Council. 
As convincingly argued by Kelemen (Ch 11), national parliaments should 
rather engage in shaping EU policies in their national capitals exercising 
effective parliamentary control over their governments.  
Several other contributions address new developments in the economic 
governance of the Eurozone. De Streel (Ch 5) advocates for a better 
distinction between technical assessments and discretionary choices in the 
European economic governance. He contends that the latter should be more 
clearly identifiable and better legitimised instead of remaining concealed 
behind the intricacies of the EU economic analysis. Beukers (Ch 6) provides 
a compellingexplanation of the relationship between the ECB and the 
executive power in the EMU. He maintains that the unconventional exercise 
of the ECB's power and the role played by the ECB in the Troika 'justifies 
speaking of central bank intervention in the area of policy-making'.13 He also 
underlines that this development has not been accompanied by a 
reinforcement of the ECB's accountability structures. In chapter 7, Lo 
Schiavo elegantly describes the origins, the functioning and the governance 
structures of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Building upon 
Schüze's findings on cooperative federalism in EU administrative law, he 
offers an original characterization of the relationship between the ECB and 
the National Competent Authorities. Lo Schiavo's contribution could have 
benefited from a more detailed inquiry into the sensitive issue of separation 
of the supervisory and monetary policy in the EMU governance framework. 
When addressing this issue, Lo Schiavo first challenges the effectiveness of 
the separation between monetary and supervisory functions in the current 
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institutional set-up. Then, he cautiously suggests that a 'relative separation'14 
is in place, relying on the fact that the SSM Regulation provides for the 
separation of the meetings and the agendas of the Governing Council when 
exercising the two functions. The institutional practice will reveal whether 
this relative separation would be sufficient and appropriate. 
Some of the most rewarding contributions to the volume focus on the 
functioning of the EU polity through the lenses of representation, 
participation and accountability. Relying upon Urbinati's theoretical 
framework, Piattoni (Ch 8) analyses the status of the EU representative 
democracy through the prism of three fundamental functions of 
representative assemblies, namely, 'voice', 'will' and 'control'. She unveils the 
'peculiar' division of labour between representative assemblies, convincingly 
arguing that the 'wrong' questions are addressed in the 'wrong assemblies'.15 
On the one hand, national parliaments debate on policy measures already 
decided at the EU level. On the other hand, the European Parliament's 
elections are focused on whether and to which extent the EU should legislate, 
'not on how [its members] actually (co-)legislate'.16 The author contends that 
the euro crisis has rendered this peculiar division of labour more evident. Yet, 
she maintains that representative assemblies are trying to bring back 'voice' 
and 'will' in the appropriate loci. National parliaments have 're-appropriated 
their constitutional role'17 and have started to address the possibility of 
reforming the Union. 
Among the most compelling issues defining the current status of the EU 
democracy, 'executive dominance' features prominently. Curtin (Ch 10) 
characterizes this phenomenon as 'the migration of executive power towards 
types of decision-making that eschew forms of electoral accountability and 
popular democratic control'.18 She scrutinizes the evolution of the EU 
executive power in its various manifestations: the 'leading' (the European 
Council); the 'normal' (the Commission) and the 'intervening' (the ECB). 
Curtin thoroughly examines the law and practice of the tree manifestations 
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of the executive power grounding her analysis on both Treaty obligations and 
institutional working practices. She also sets the exercise of executive power 
against the three different stages of accountability she identifies. Curtin's 
findings are not entirely reassuring on the status of the EU democracy. She 
powerfully captures the gist of the challenges of accountability in the EU 
underlining that the EP does not adequately challenge the dominance of the 
executive actors at the EU level.19 Less bleak is the picture she portrays of 
some national parliaments, as the House of Commons in the UK, which have 
been able to exert countervailing power to confine the executives.20 The 
author's reform proposal is oriented towards a less executive-dominated 
future to be achieved through more constructive horizontal dialogue 
between parliaments. Curtin is very effective in pointing out that the capacity 
and the responsibility of parliaments to fully exercise their role in the political 
system without being dominated by the executives ultimately rest with the 
parliaments themselves.21 The necessity for the European and national 
parliaments to effectively exercise their controlling roles vis á vis the 
executives is crucial in light of the shortcomings, accurately highlighted by 
Marxsen (Ch 9), of the mechanisms of participatory democracy in the EU.22 
A final cluster of contributions enters into the engaging debate on the 
institutional parliamentarisation of the EC brought about by the European 
Parliament elections in 2014. Kocharov (Ch 13) provides sound arguments 
against what she depicts as the 'Spitzenkandidaten invention'.23 After a 
thoughtful scrutiny of the letter of the Treaty, she finds that assigning a 
dominant position to the Parliament in nominating the candidate for 
President of the Commission would amount to a change necessitating Treaty 
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amendment. Indeed, this would revert the procedure envisaged by the 
Treaties.24 In addition, Kocharov denounces the inappropriateness of the 
politicization of the Commission through an inquiry into the spirit of the 
treaties. Since the European Commission is not ultimately driving the 
European policy choice25, assigning accountability for shortcomings in the 
EU policy output to the President of the Commission would allow Member 
State governments to 'evade democratic accountability in the national 
political process'.26 With a remarkable intellectually sophisticated analysis of 
the peculiar constitutional construct of legitimacy of the EU, she highlights 
the pitfalls entailed in modelling accountability for Union policies on that of 
a state. According to Kocharov, in the current Treaty framework, 'legitimacy 
of the Union derives from the national political process'27 and as 
'[a]ccountability needs to follow the locus of power', the attempts to devise a 
European democracy which 'bypasses accountability on the national level' 
exacerbates the risks of undermining the legitimacy of both the Union and 
national governments.28 
 
Antphöler (Ch 12) shares Kocharov's criticism towards 'unwarranted 
analogies with nation states' and towards the progressive erosion of the 
agenda-setting powers of the Commission.29 He reaches, however, opposite 
conclusions. Antphöler convincingly describes article 17(7) TEU as a 
provision 'offer[ing] a framework for the political process to function' which 
does not enshrine any 'duty for the institutions to behave in a certain 
manner'.30 He therefore questions the utilization of the dichotomy of 
legal/illegal for assessing the Spitzenkandidaten procedure. I found myself in 
accord with this characterization. I think that the politicization of the 
European Commission's President, albeit legally and politically contestable, 
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30 ibid 222. 
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demonstrates how the mechanisms governing the dynamic evolution of a 
legal system may change the legal norms themselves.31 As it has been 
convincingly argued, this dynamic reflects 'the primacy of politics over law'.32 
Antphöler goes further, maintaining that the 'increased democratic 
credential of the Commission and stronger standing in public'33 resulting 
from this procedure could counteract the fragile democratic foundations of 
the depoliticized and intergovernmental crisis management and the 
European Council predominance. I am, however, rather sceptical that this 
change would produce any improvement in terms of democratic legitimacy 
of the EU. As emphasized by Craig, the EP and the EC are not the only 
centres of political decision in the EU, and the role of the Council and the 
European Council in determining the EU policy agenda is not affected by this 
new procedure. Doubts on this matter are also casted by Kelemen. In his 
thought-provoking contribution, Kelemen underlines the inappropriateness 
of trying to export Westminster, majoritarian visions of democracy to the 
EU, which remains a consensus democracy. Moreover, he perceptively points 
out the negative consequences that might arise from the politicization of the 
Commission President and from the strengthened participation of the 
national parliaments in the EU governance. 
In conclusion, albeit the book certainly delivers on its promises, the analysis 
on how the governance in the EU and Eurozone works could have been 
explored further with an inquiry on the role played by the EU in the global 
financial and economic institutions. Indeed, the separation of powers in the 
EU manifests all its complexity in the external representation of the euro 
area. A discussion on the proposals of institutional reforms in this domain 
could have offered a more comprehensive picture on the system of 
governance of the EU and the Eurozone. Moreover, one of the major 
controversial issues on which the book is premised is the existence of an EU 
government. The EU is traditionally understood as a system 'governance 
without Government' and the absence of the possibility to replace a 
government responsible of discretionary policy choices through the elections 
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lies at the very foundations of the EU's problems of accountability and 
representativeness.34 Only Curtin engages in the exercise of explaining the 
interrelationship between governance and government in the EU.35 Given 
the crucial relevance of this issue for the development of the themes 
addressed in the book, it would have been beneficial if this clarification 
exercise had been undertaken at the beginning of the volume by the editors 
or in a dedicated contribution. 
The issues tackled in the book eschew easy simplifications. The responses to 
the euro-crisis have elicited complex transformations in the intra-EU 
allocation of powers. New delicate supervisory functions have been assigned 
to the ECB. The Commission has seen strengthened its role in the 
coordination and sanctioning of the Member States' fiscal policies. These 
changes have not been accompanied by equally significant improvements in 
the legitimacy and accountability of the EU constitutional construct. In 
particular, the Spitzenkandidaten procedure and other attempts to overhaul 
the democratic foundations of the EU have not produced the expected 
results. The contributors have managed to present these knotty issues in a 
clear and refined manner. This is one of the major strength of the volume 
which constitutes a valid point of reference for scholars and policy-makers 
interested in the debate on the challenges the EU and the EMU are facing.  
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